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By being among the last states to write a constitution, we now 
have the advantages of correcting the mistakes of others, 
simplicity, and the delegation of responsibility, which can be 
clearly seen by our citizens. Rather than expressing details, as 
did the constitutions of many states, ours set broad goals for the 
new state of Alaska. Details would come later during the 
legislative process. 
 
-Former Alaska Governor Tony Knowles1 
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 1.  Tony Knowles, Foreword to GERALD A. MCBEATH, THE ALASKA STATE 
CONSTITUTION: A REFERENCE GUIDE xix, xx (1997).  
 [I]n state constitution-making we must be content with something less 
than the Platonic ideal; we must aim rather for a constitutional document 
that is designed to enable the state to carry on its work of government 
today and in the foreseeable future with efficiency and economy and 
with adequate powers to undertake its tasks . . . Viewed in that light, we 
are likely to discover that a flexible and adaptable instrument that helps 
us in the solution of today’s problems is likely to be effective, with only 
minor modifications, in managing tomorrow’s tasks as well. It is 
precisely the broad and flexible charters of the late nineteenth century 
that were too closely concerned with the solutions of many narrowly 
specific and immediate problems that have become obsolete and that 
interfere with contemporary solutions because of their mass of detail and 
resulting rigidity.   
FRANK P. GRAD & ROBERT F. WILLIAMS, 2 STATE CONSTITUTIONS FOR THE TWENTY-
FIRST CENTURY: DRAFTING STATE CONSTITUTIONS, REVISIONS, AND AMENDMENTS 7–8 
(2006); see also id. at 14–30. 
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One of the dismaying realities of American legal education, 
particularly at its most elite level, is the abject ignorance 
displayed about the importance of state constitutions and even 
of state judiciaries, even though most of the common law cases 
that students read arise in state courts. Still, too many students 
may well graduate from three years of legal study with the 
perception that the only Constitution operating within the 
United States is the national document and that the only courts 
one need really focus on are federal courts, particularly, of 
course, the United States Supreme Court. 
-Professor Sanford Levinson2 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The editors of the Alaska Law Review are to be commended for taking 
the state constitution seriously.3 This is, of course, nothing new because 
the Alaska Law Review has, since its inception, included important 
scholarship on the Alaska Constitution. 
Alaska’s 1955-56 Constitutional Convention was the penultimate 
step in a decades-long campaign for Alaskan statehood.4 When Alaska 
finally gained its statehood, its state constitution took its place with the 
other forty-nine American subnational constitutions. While preparing the 
Alaska Constitution, delegates to Alaska’s 1955–56 Constitutional 
Convention might well have echoed the words Delegate John Dickinson 
uttered at the beginning of the 1787 Federal Constitutional Convention: 
“Experience must be our only guide.”5 This theme of building on the 
experiences of other states ran throughout the production of the Alaska 
Constitution. 
This Article will focus on the general characteristics of American 
state, or subnational, constitutions,6 locating the Alaska Constitution 
within that state constitutional tradition rather than our federal 
 
 2.  Sanford V. Levinson, Foreword to MICHAEL L. BUENGER & PAUL J. DE 
MUNIZ, AMERICAN JUDICIAL POWER: THE STATE COURT PERSPECTIVE ix (2015).  
 3.  See e.g., Robert C. Welsh & Ronald K. L. Collins, Taking State Constitutions 
Seriously, CENTER MAG., Sept.–Oct. 1981, at 6.   
 4.  Michael Schwaiger, Understanding the Unoriginal: Indeterminant 
Originalism and Independent Interpretation of the Alaska Constitution, 22 ALASKA L. 
REV. 293, 303 n.45 (2005). 
 5.  Robert F. Williams, “Experience Must Be Our Only Guide”: The State 
Constitutional Experience of the Framers of the Federal Constitution, 15 HASTINGS 
CONST. L.Q. 403, 421 (1988). 
 6.  American state constitutions, of course, are internal constitutions that 
operate within the dominant Federal Constitution. ROBERT F. WILLIAMS, THE LAW 
OF AMERICAN STATE CONSTITUTIONS 17 (2009).  
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constitutional tradition. This focus will include a brief discussion of “New 
Judicial Federalism,” where state courts interpret their state constitutions 
to provide broader protective rights than those recognized by the United 
States Supreme Court under the Federal Constitution. I will then discuss 
specific characteristics of the Alaska Constitution and judicial 
interpretations of it, within the national context. 
II. THE ALASKA CONSTITUTION AS A SUBNATIONAL 
CONSTITUTION 
An article by my long-time Rutgers Political Science colleague, Alan 
Tarr, perceptively locates the current Alaska Constitution within its 
comparative “time and place.”7 Each of the constitutions of the non-
original states is part of an epic story of that state’s transition from 
colonial or territorial status to statehood. Consequently, as pointed out by 
former-Governor Knowles above, Alaskans had the benefit of these epic 
stories of virtually all of the other states. Alaskans could look to these 
states’ experiences both with their initial constitutions and after their 
admissions to the Union as they continued to tinker with provisions on 
government structure, rights guarantees, and the entrenchment of policy 
matters in their state constitutions.8 One recent analyst of Wisconsin’s 
statehood constitution-making process stated: 
Western state formation, even in its concrete form of 
constitutional conventions and founding texts, required a touch 
of fiction . . . . For the writing of a constitution necessitated that 
Wisconsin citizens imagine their state in its future life. In other 
words, they had to engage in a kind of (political) science fiction.9 
The experiences of other states make this exercise in imagination easier, 
but not necessarily simple, for later-formed states like Alaska. 
About half of the states in the United States were admitted to the 
Union pursuant to a congressional “enabling act.” These enactments 
directed territories seeking statehood in a number of specific ways with 
respect to processes for drafting their proposed constitutions, and often 
required the inclusion of specific constitutional provisions. Alaska was 
 
 7.  G. Alan Tarr, Of Time, Place and the Alaska Constitution, 35 ALASKA L. REV. 
155 (2018). 
 8.  See generally James A. Henretta, Foreword: Rethinking the State 
Constitutional Tradition, 22 RUTGERS L.J. 819 (1991) (tracking the development, 
decline, and rebirth of influence of state constitutions).  
 9.  BETHEL SALER, THE SETTLERS’ EMPIRE: COLONIALISM AND STATE FORMATION 
IN AMERICA’S OLD NORTHWEST 249 (2015) (footnotes omitted); see also id. at 2 
(“United States is a ‘settler nation’ . . . These settler societies possess an ambivalent 
double history as both colonized and colonizers.”). 
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not admitted pursuant to an enabling act, so it proceeded toward 
statehood without such advance direction.10 Alaska was free from 
congressional requirements that could have had lasting effects on Alaska 
after joining the Union.11 Despite this apparent independence, the Alaska 
Constitutional Convention seems to have limited itself by focusing on 
presenting a statehood constitution to Congress that would most easily 
lead to acceptance into the Union.12 This focus often came at the expense 
of innovation in the constitution. 
Alaska’s decision not to innovate in its constitution was 
understandable in the context of its quest for statehood and desire to 
avoid congressional delay. However, it also illustrates a broader point 
about American state constitutions and, indeed, subnational constitutions 
worldwide. Our Federal Constitution leaves an expansive “subnational 
constitutional space,” allowing states to innovate in the design of their 
state constitutions.13 There are common variations in our state 
constitutions such as elected or appointed judiciaries, plural or single 
executives, differing rights guarantees, etc., but there are very few true 
innovations in state constitutions. Only one state has a unicameral 
legislature;14 none have a parliamentary system.15 The subnational 
constitutional space in other nations’ federal constitutions is less 
expansive, but it is still underutilized, as in America.16 Alaska’s 
experience of choosing to forego innovation in favor of easier acceptance 
into the Union, provides one understandable reason for this 
phenomenon. 
 
 10.  Tarr, supra note 7, at 163. 
 11.  See, e.g., Fain Land & Cattle Co. v. Hassell, 790 P.2d 242, 597–98 (Ariz. 
1990) (restricting Arizona’s disposal of state trust lands to methods enumerated 
in the Enabling Act and included in the Arizona Constitution). For a detailed 
analysis of the kinds of provisions required from states seeking admission to the 
Union, contained in the enabling acts, see Eric Biber, The Price of Admission: Causes, 
Effects, and Patterns of Conditions Imposed on the States Entering the Union, 46 AM. J. 
LEGAL HIST. 119, 120 (2004) (explaining congressional history of imposing 
additional burdens on admission to the Union). 
 12.  Schwaiger, supra note 4, at 303–04. 
 13.  Robert F. Williams & G. Alan Tarr, Subnational Constitutional Space: A View 
From the States, Provinces, Regions, Länder, and Cantons, in FEDERALISM, 
SUBNATIONAL CONSTITUTIONS, AND MINORITY RIGHTS 3, 4–5 (G. Alan Tarr, Robert F. 
Williams & Joseph Marko eds., 2004); Robert F. Williams, Teaching and Researching 
Comparative Subnational Constitutional Law, 115 PENN ST. L. REV. 1109, 1112 (2011). 
 14.  NEB. CONST. art III, § 1. See infra note 51 and accompanying text (analyzing 
practical development and usage of Nebraska Constitution). 
 15.  Jonathan Zasloft, Why No Parliaments in the United States?, 35 U. PA. J. INT’L 
L. 269, 270 (2013). 
 16.  Williams & Tarr, supra note 13, at 14–15; Williams, supra note 13, at 1114–
15. 
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American state constitutions differ in many important respects from 
the more familiar Federal Constitution. Unlike the federal constitutional 
process, state constitutions and their amendments emanate directly from 
the people of the state through votes on new constitutions, revisions, and 
amendments.17 This provides a constitutional interpretation technique 
that is not available in federal constitutional doctrine, where state 
constitutional provisions can be seen as the “voice of the people.” This 
means that voters’ pamphlets and guides, and even newspaper analyses 
can be relevant when interpreting the meaning of the state constitution.18 
In the words of the New Jersey Supreme Court: 
It is a familiar rule of construction that where phraseology is 
precise and unambiguous there is no room for judicial 
interpretation or for resort to extrinsic materials. The language 
speaks for itself, and where found in our State Constitution the 
language is the voice of the people. As this Court said some 
twenty years ago, 
[T]he Constitution derives its force, not from the 
Convention which framed it, but from the people who 
ratified it: and the intent to be arrived at is that of the people. 
 
 The Constitution was written “to be understood by the 
voters: its words and phrases were used in their normal and 
ordinary as distinguished from technical meaning”; and 
“where the intention is clear there is no room for 
construction and no excuse for interpolation or addition.”19 
State constitutions have evolved over the years to include policy matters 
and “positive rights” that can (and possibly should) be seen as more 
appropriate for statutory law.20 Christopher Hammons formulated the 
distinction between “framework-oriented” and “policy-oriented” 
 
 17.  WILLIAMS, supra note 6, at 20. The exception is the state of Delaware, in 
which the state constitution may be amended by the legislature.  
Article XVI describes two different procedures for changing the 
Delaware Constitution. These procedures include an amendment 
process by the General Assembly and a revision process by a 
constitutional convention. Neither procedure permits the people to vote 
directly on proposed changes to the Delaware Constitution. Neither 
procedure requires the governor’s approval. 
RANDY J. HOLLAND, THE DELAWARE STATE CONSTITUTION: A REFERENCE GUIDE 228 
(2002). 
 18.  WILLIAMS, supra note 6, at 25–27, 315. 
 19.  Vreeland v. Byrne, 370 A.2d 825, 830 (N.J. 1977) (quoting Gangemi v. 
Berry, 134 A.2d 1, 16 (N.J. 1957)). 
 20.  WILLIAMS, supra note 6, at 22–23. 
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provisions in state constitutions, concluding that the national average was 
about forty percent policy-oriented.21 
Furthermore, while the Federal Constitution enumerates powers for 
the federal government, the state constitutions operate within the plenary 
powers reserved to the states, where enumerations of power are 
unnecessary. As such, instead of delineating additional powers, state 
constitutions operate primarily as documents of limitation.22 
Additionally, state constitutions are much easier to amend than the 
Federal Constitution. Therefore, state constitutions have grown in length 
over the years, through additional constitutional conventions or the 
amendment process.23 
Assessments of American constitutionalism rarely look to state 
constitutions, instead focusing exclusively on the Federal Constitution 
and its interpretation by the Supreme Court. Focusing on the Federal 
Constitution leads to the conclusion that America is “exceptional” when 
compared with other nations because of the static nature and absence of 
positive rights in the Federal Constitution. However, careful analysis has 
recently clarified the possible error of this point of view: 
 Our analysis reveals three important features of state 
constitutions that should prompt reconsideration of US 
constitutional exceptionalism. First, like most of the world’s 
constitutions, state constitutions are rather long and elaborate, 
and they include detailed policy choices. The exceptional 
American taste for constitutional brevity, it turns out, is confined 
to the federal document alone. Second, like most of the world’s 
 
 21.  Christopher W. Hammons, State Constitutional Reform: Is it Necessary?, 64 
ALB. L. REV. 1327, 1333 (2001). Walter Dodd emphasized an important reason for 
“legislation” in state constitutions: 
Similar reasons in some cases account for the placing of legislation in the 
constitution itself. For example, when the highest state court has 
declared unconstitutional a statute limiting labor on public works to 
eight hours a day, the people may put into the constitution an 
authorization for such legislation, but they may with equal brevity put 
the legislative action into the constitution itself. 
Walter F. Dodd, The Function of a State Constitution, 30 POL. SCI. Q. 201, 213 (1915); 
see also JAMES WILLARD HURST, THE GROWTH OF AMERICAN LAW: THE LAW MAKERS 
231–38, 240–46 (1950) (tracking comparative influence of constitution makers, 
executives, and legislators). 
 22.  WILLIAMS, supra note 6, at 27. Therefore, many of the difficult questions of 
judicial interpretation of state constitutions involve implied limitations on power. 
Walter F. Dodd, Implied Powers and Implied Limitations in Constitutional Law, 29 
YALE L.J. 137, 160 (1919). 
 23.  See generally JOHN J. DINAN, STATE CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICS: GOVERNING 
BY AMENDMENT IN THE AMERICAN STATES (2018) (asserting the relative ease of state 
amendment processes makes amendments a realistic and regular vehicle for 
seeking change). 
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constitutions, state constitutions are frequently amended, 
overhauled, and replaced. Thus, the textual stability of the over-
two-century-old federal Constitution is exceptional compared 
not only with other national constitutions but also with the 
constitutions of the American states, which are characterized, in 
part, by a commitment to progress and change. Third, like most 
of the world’s constitutions, state constitutions contain positive 
rights, such as a right to free education, labor rights, social 
welfare rights, and environmental rights. While the federal 
Constitution arguably omits explicit declarations of these rights, 
they are not foreign to the American constitutional tradition. On 
all these dimensions, it is at the federal level only that 
Americans’ constitutional practices appear exceptional. When 
we include the writing and revision of state constitutions in our 
assessment, it becomes clear that American constitutionalism is 
not nearly as distinctive as most comparative studies and 
political commentators have suggested.24 
This reinterpretation of American constitutionalism has continued 
by evaluating the question of “entrenchment” in constitutions.25 
A dominant theme of the constitutional theory literature is that 
successful constitutions must not only constrain those in power, 
but must do so over long time horizons, establishing constraints 
durable enough to bind across generations . . . . By entrenching 
commitments, constitutions serve as a mechanism for 
overcoming the inconsistency of preferences over time.26 
Scholars insist that entrenchment is necessary because it removes matters 
from the political agenda and allows political parties to form new 
democracies with established rules. Entrenched constitutions are “spare 
frameworks,” rigid, and characterized by “generality and abstraction.”27 
Again, this may be too narrow a view of the American state constitutions 
and other nations’ constitutions: 
The model of an entrenched and spare document, which 
changes meaning primarily through judicial interpretation, 
successfully describes the U.S. Constitution. However, it does a 
 
 24.  Mila Versteeg & Emily Zackin, American Constitutional Exceptionalism 
Revisited, 81 U. CHI. L. REV. 1641, 1644–45 (2014); see generally EMILY J. ZACKIN, 
LOOKING FOR RIGHTS IN ALL THE WRONG PLACES: WHY STATE CONSTITUTIONS 
CONTAIN AMERICA’S POSITIVE RIGHTS (2013). 
 25.  Mila Versteeg & Emily Zackin, Constitutions Unentrenched: Toward An 
Alternative Theory of Constitutional Design, 110 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 657, 657 (2016). 
 26.  Id. 
 27.  Id. at 658. 
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poor job of depicting most other national democratic 
constitutions, or even U.S. state constitutions. As we will 
demonstrate, specific and unentrenched constitutions 
developed over the course of the nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries, and are now the dominant form of constitutionalism 
across the globe, and within the U.S. states. We argue that these 
polities’ flexible and detailed constitutional texts embody an 
alternative model of constitutionalism. Rather than entrenching 
constraints through spare and stable texts, these constitutions 
provide officeholders—judges, legislatures and executives—
with specific and frequently modified instructions. Although 
these flexible constitutions do not entrench commitments over 
long time horizons, we argue that they are nonetheless attempts 
to constrain the exercise of political power by leaving 
empowered actors with fewer choices about which policies to 
pursue.28 
Thus, we are seeing the beginning of a theoretical reassessment of the 
differences between our federal and state constitutions.29 These 
reassessments clearly demonstrate that our state constitutions are not 
simply little versions of our Federal Constitution. This distinction is 
crucial to understanding the Alaska Constitution. 
III. ALASKA AND THE NEW JUDICIAL FEDERALISM 
Ravin v. State30 is probably the most well-recognized decision of the 
Alaska Supreme Court. In Ravin, the Court held that Alaska’s textual 
privacy guarantee31 protected an individual’s right to possess marijuana 
in the home.32 As seen in Ravin, the Alaska Supreme Court was a very 
early proponent of the New Judicial Federalism, whereby state courts 
 
 28.  Id. 
 29.  See G. Alan Tarr, Constitutional Theory and State Constitutional 
Interpretation, 22 RUTGERS L.J. 841, 842 (1991) (providing an early call for this 
theoretical reassessment). 
 30.  537 P.2d 494, 503 (Alaska 1975). Commentary on this decision has 
occupied many pages in this Law Review. See, e.g., John F. Grossbauer, Note, 
Alaska’s Right to Privacy Ten Years After Ravin v. State: Developing a Jurisprudence of 
Privacy, 2 ALASKA L. REV. 159, 160–69 (1985); Jason Brandeis, The Continuing 
Vitality of Ravin v. State: Alaskans Still Have a Constitutional Right to Possess 
Marijuana in the Privacy of Their Homes, 29 ALASKA L. REV. 175, 175–236 (2012); Jason 
Brandeis, Ravin Revisited: Alaska’s Historic Common Law Marijuana Rule at the Dawn 
of Legalization, 32 ALASKA L. REV. 309, 309–47 (2015). 
 31.  ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 22 (“The Right of the People to Privacy is 
Recognized and Shall not be Infringed. The Legislature shall implement this 
section.”). See also Ken Gormley & Rhonda G. Hartman, Privacy and the States, 65 
TEMPLE L. REV. 1279, 1280 (1992) (tracking the development of the right to privacy). 
 32.  Ravin, supra note 30, at 513. 
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interpret their own state constitutions to provide more protective rights 
than those recognized by United States Supreme Court interpretations of 
the Federal Constitution.33 In 1970, for example, long before Justice 
William J. Brennan, Jr.’s famous 1977 article encouraging state courts to 
go beyond federal constitutional protections,34 the court in Baker v. City of 
Fairbanks35 issued the following ringing endorsement of independent state 
constitutional law: 
[W]e recognize that this result has not been reached in certain 
other jurisdictions or by the United States Supreme Court. The 
mere fact, however, that the United States Supreme Court has 
not extended the right to jury trial to all types of offenses does 
not preclude us from acting in this field. While we must enforce 
the minimum constitutional standards imposed upon us by the 
United States Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, we are free, and we are under a duty, to develop 
additional constitutional rights and privileges under our Alaska 
Constitution if we find such fundamental rights and privileges 
to be within the intention and spirit of our local constitutional 
language and to be necessary for the kind of civilized life and 
ordered liberty which is at the core of our constitutional heritage. 
We need not stand by idly and passively, waiting for 
constitutional direction from the highest court of the land. 
Instead, we should be moving concurrently to develop and 
expound the principles imbedded in our constitutional law.36 
California Supreme Court Justice Goodwin Liu has recently reviewed the 
New Judicial Federalism and Justice Brennan’s impact, concluding that 
the “redundancy” in the federal and state rights guarantees is an 
 
 33.  WILLIAMS, supra note 6, at 7, 113–19. 
 34.  William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual 
Rights, 90 HARV. L. REV. 489, 491 (1977). Justice Brennan’s article, although 
published only in 1977, is among the “most frequently cited law review articles of 
modern times.” Ann Lousin, Justice Brennan: A Tribute to a Federal Judge Who 
Believes in State’s Rights, 20 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 1, 2 n.3 (1986). Justice Stewart G. 
Pollock of the New Jersey Supreme Court referred to Justice Brennan’s article as 
the “Magna Carta of state constitutional law.” Stewart G. Pollock, State 
Constitutions as Separate Sources of Fundamental Rights, 35 RUTGERS L. REV. 707, 716 
(1983). Justice Brennan updated his views in The Bill of Rights and the States: The 
Revival of State Constitutions as Guardians of Individual Rights, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 535 
(1986).  
 35.  471 P.2d 386 (Alaska 1970). 
 36.  Id. at 401–02 (emphasis added). See Thomas V. Van Flein, The Baker 
Doctrine and the New Federalism: Developing Independent Constitutional Principles 
Under the Alaska Constitution, 21 ALASKA L. REV. 227, 242 (2004) (“Each individual 
state, including Alaska, should reevaluate its respective state constitution and 
promote the development of state law independently of federal doctrine.”); see 
generally Schwaiger, supra note 4. 
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extremely positive attribute of American constitutionalism.37 This is 
clearly recognized by courts in Alaska. Justice Liu said: “The 
redundancies built into our structure of government largely serve to 
channel and manage conflict rather than to facilitate permanent 
resolution.”38 He continued: 
State constitutionalism is properly understood as a mechanism 
by which ongoing disagreement over fundamental principles is 
acknowledged and channeled in our democracy. Far from 
endangering the legitimacy of constitutional law, interpretive 
pluralism is a source of its resilience and deep resonance with 
our diverse citizenry. When a state court departs from Supreme 
Court precedent to secure greater protection for individual 
rights under a parallel provision of its state constitution, the state 
court “registers a forceful and often very public dissent.” 
Whether or not it influences other states or eventually induces 
the Supreme Court to reconsider its precedent, the state decision 
carries forward a dialogue over the meaning of our basic 
liberties. In short, state constitutionalism is one way in which our 
structure of government provides an outlet for constitutional 
conflict.39 
States such as Alaska have now progressed quite far into the New Judicial 
Federalism. One may ask whether this movement has resulted in 
enhanced rights protection for Americans. One point of view holds: 
By diffusing governmental power, federalism permits the 
constituent units of a federal system to determine to a significant 
extent the ends that they will pursue and the means by which 
they will accomplish those ends. Implicit in federal 
arrangements is the expectation that the retention of these 
choices by the constituent governments will produce diversity; 
that given the opportunity, these governments will order their 
affairs in diverse ways. Thus, federalism can claim to serve the 
ends of both pluralism and self-government. In doing so, 
however, federalism necessarily sacrifices complete uniformity 
of treatment for those ruled by the various constituent 
governments. Put simply, in a federal system many of the laws 
one must obey, the benefits one receives, and the rights one 
 
 37.  Goodwin Liu, Brennan Lecture, State Constitutions and the Protection of 
Individual Rights: A Reappraisal, 92 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1307, 1313 (2017). 
 38.  Id. at 1335. 
 39.  Id. at 1336. 
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enjoys depend on the political jurisdiction in which one 
resides.40 
Other scholars have put it a bit differently: 
Any system that enhances some norms must, perforce, diminish 
others. It is clear that the norm of efficiency is not fostered by the 
dispersal of judicial power. It is certainly cheaper and easier to 
understand and deal with a court system with one set of rules, 
decisions, and rights than it is to deal with fifty-one. To the 
extent that judicial federalism allows or even encourages 
differential treatment of issues and people, the norm of 
uniformity is also clearly a victim. But we must be careful to 
point out that uniformity neither guarantees nor prevents 
equitable treatment. To confuse uniformity with justice in all 
cases would be a grave error.41 
Here, the positive aspects of “redundancy,” discussed earlier, must be 
kept in mind. The Alaska Constitution provides numerous provisions 
that should be viewed in this light.42 
IV. THE ALASKA CONSTITUTION IN THE NATIONAL CONTEXT 
American state constitutions, by contrast to our Federal 
Constitution, lend themselves to comparative analysis. In many respects, 
Alaska’s Constitution compares favorably. 
Alaska has opted for the minority view that state judges should be 
appointed, but run for retention.43 As Professor Charles Geyh has recently 
stated, “Without legitimacy, the judiciary is helpless to thwart defiance of 
its decisions.”44 If a state like Alaska installs an appointive system and the 
“public ceases to trust judges or those who appoint judges,” then opting 
for electoral accountability could “preserve or restore legitimacy.”45 On 
the other hand, if the public comes to view an electoral system as 
 
 40.  ELLIS KATZ & G. ALAN TARR, FEDERALISM AND RIGHTS ix–x (1996). 
 41.  MICHAEL E. SOLIMINE & JAMES L. WALKER, RESPECTING STATE COURTS: THE 
INEVITABILITY OF JUDICIAL FEDERALISM 141 (1999). 
 42.  See, e.g., ALASKA CONST. art. VII, §§ 1, 4–5. 
 43.  ALASKA CONST. art. IV, §§ 5–6; see also Albert J. Klumpp, Alaska’s Judicial 
Retention Elections: A Comparative Analysis, 34 ALASKA L. REV. 143, 146–47 (2017) 
(stating that twenty-two U.S. states require at least some judges to be elected for 
retention); Teri Carns & Susie Dosik, Alaska’s Merit Selection of Judges: The Council’s 
Role, Past and Present, 35 ALASKA L. REV. 177 (2018); Walter Carpeneti & Brett 
Frazer, Merit Selection of Judges in Alaska: the Judicial Council, the Independence of the 
Judiciary, and the Popular Will, 35 ALASKA L. REV. 205 (2018). 
 44.  Charles Gardner Geyh, Judicial Selection and the Search for Middle Ground, 
67 DEPAUL L. REV. 333, 367 (2018). 
 45.  Id. 
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“including the perception that justice is for sale in privately financed 
judicial campaigns,” the pressure will arise for an appointed system.46 
Alan Tarr has described the controversy in state courts: 
Both sides in the contemporary debate over judicial 
independence and judicial accountability—we shall refer to 
them as the Bashers and the Defenders—claim to support the 
rule of law, but they disagree about what threatens it. Defenders 
see the danger as coming from external pressures on judges by 
those who seek to influence or intimidate them or induce them 
to abandon their commitment to the law in favor of what is 
popular or politically acceptable. But Bashers view the danger as 
rooted in the absence of checks on judges, which frees them to 
pursue their political or ideological or professional or class 
agendas at the expense of fidelity to the law. Impartial decision 
making, according to Bashers, is best promoted by the prospect 
of retribution for judicial activism, which keeps in line judges 
who might otherwise be tempted to read their own preferences 
into the law.47 
What about the content of the Alaska Constitution? One analysis has 
concluded that only twenty-two percent of Alaska’s constitution consists 
of policy-oriented provisions,48 well below the national average of about 
forty percent.49 Of course, what constitutes a policy-oriented provision 
rather than a framework-oriented provision can be in the eye of the 
beholder, and neutral, academic observers may not appreciate the 
important historic and political reasons why state constitutions contain 
certain detailed provisions. 
Notably, despite its focus on a non-innovative state constitution, the 
Alaska Constitutional Convention did debate the possibility of a 
unicameral legislature.50 The Convention ultimately opted for a bicameral 
legislature,  declining to adopt Nebraska’s unicameral legislature model.51 
 
 46.  Id. at 367–68. 
 47.  G. ALAN TARR, WITHOUT FEAR OR FAVOR: JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE AND 
JUDICIAL ACCOUNTABILITY IN THE STATES 2 (2012). 
 48.  Christopher W. Hammons, Was James Madison Wrong? Rethinking the 
American Preference for Short Framework-Oriented Constitution, 93 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 
837, 837, 847 (1999) (referring to policy-oriented provisions as “particularistic”).  
 49.  Hammons, supra note 21; see also Hammons, supra note 48, at 840 
(“[Thirty-nine percent] of the typical state constitution is devoted to matters that 
most scholars consider extraneous at best.”).  
 50.  Jonathan S. Ross, Note, A New Answer for an Old Question: Should Alaska 
Once Again Consider a Unicameral Legislature, 27 ALASKA L. REV. 257, 264–71 (2010); 
see also GERALD A. MCBEATH, THE ALASKA STATE CONSTITUTION: A REFERENCE 
GUIDE 70 (1997). 
 51.  ROBERT D. MIEWALD & PETER J. LONGO, THE NEBRASKA STATE 
CONSTITUTION: A REFERENCE GUIDE 19, 55–57 (1993). 
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The Convention also followed many other state constitutions in 
endowing the governor with the item veto.52 Following the model of a 
number of state constitutions adopted in the Progressive Era,53 the 
Convention opted to supplement legislative power with the initiative 
process.54 
The Convention also included a mandate of a public education, 
following the lead of the existing states.55 The area of public school 
financing has been among the important areas of state constitutional 
litigation since the defeat of a federal claim for equal and adequate 
funding of public schools.56 Education is one of the most important 
reserved powers of the states and is predictably a topic that is covered in 
state constitutions. 
Among the most misunderstood state constitutional provisions are 
the varied equality guarantees.57 The Alaska Supreme Court has 
interpreted the Alaska Constitution’s Equal Protection Clause58 to be 
“more protective of individual rights than the Federal Equal Protection 
clause.”59 In 2016, for example, the Alaska Supreme Court struck down a 
parental notification requirement for minors’ abortions under the Alaska 
equality clause.60 
Another major area of litigation under state constitutions has been 
free speech and assembly protections on private property such as 
 
 52.  See Nicholas Passarello, Note, The Item Veto and the Threat of Appropriations 
Bundling in Alaska, 30 ALASKA L. REV. 125, 131 (2015) (“Most state governors 
possess at least some form of item veto.”). This additional gubernatorial check on 
the legislative branch, envied by every President, has been an important tool for 
governors’ involvement with the fiscal affairs of the state. See generally Richard 
Briffault, The Item Veto in State Courts, 66 TEMPLE L. REV. 1171 (1993). 
 53.  See generally John Dinan, Framing a “People’s Government”: State 
Constitution-Making in the Progressive Era, 30 RUTGERS L.J. 933 (1999). 
 54.  M. Katheryn Bradley & Deborah L. Williams, “Be It Enacted by the People 
of the State of Alaska . . .” —A Practitioner’s Guide to Alaska’s Initiative Law, 9 ALASKA 
L. REV. 279, 279 (1992); see generally Logan T. Mohs, Note, Alaska’s Initiative Process: 
The Benefits of Advanced Oversight and a Recommendation for Change, 31 ALASKA L. 
REV. 295 (2014). 
 55.  Chris Lott, Note, The Methodological Middle Ground: Finding an Adequacy 
Standard in Alaska’s Education Clause, 24 ALASKA L. REV. 73 (2007); Kate Wheelock, 
The Future of Challenges to the Alaska Public School Funding Scheme after State v. 
Ketchikan, 34 ALASKA L. REV. 111, 126 (2017). 
 56.  See generally San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973); 
Jeffrey S. Sutton, San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez and Its 
Aftermath, 94 VA. L. REV. 1963 (2008).  
 57.  WILLIAMS, supra note 6, at 211–16. 
 58.  ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 1 (“all persons are equal and entitled to equal 
rights”). 
 59.  State v. Anthony, 810 P.2d 155, 157 (Alaska 1991). 
 60.  Planned Parenthood of the Great Nw. v. State, 375 P.3d 1122, 1128 (Alaska 
2016). 
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shopping malls.61 Federal First Amendment free speech doctrine does not, 
as of now, protect free speech and assembly on such private property.62 
The question, one of “state action,” has been analyzed in the Alaskan 
context in the pages of this Law Review.63 
Unlike the provisions in most state constitutions dealing with 
religion,64 Alaska’s Article I, Section 4 is very brief and mirrors the federal 
First Amendment.65 Despite its similar structure, however, it does not 
have to be interpreted the same way the United States Supreme Court 
interprets the First Amendment.66 
The automatic referendum is one of Alaska’s choices of how to 
balance the interests of rigidity and ease of change, a tension present in 
every constitution. For example, whereas Thomas Jefferson supported 
easily amendable constitutions with review every generation,67 James 
Madison supported more permanent constitutions.68 As I have said, “If 
state constitutional revision is too difficult, constitutionalism overwhelms 
democracy; if it is too easy, democracy overwhelms constitutionalism. It 
is difficult to achieve exactly the right balance, and this point might 
change over time.”69 The automatic referendum on constitutional 
conventions errs on the side of democracy over constitutionalism, by 
increasing the ease of constitutional revision.70 
 
 61.  See generally Jennifer A. Klear, Comparison of the Federal Courts’ and the New 
Jersey Supreme Court’s Treatments of Free Speech on Private Property: Where Won’t We 
Have the Freedom to Speak Next? 33 RUTGERS L.J. 589 (2002). 
 62.  Id. at 590–95. 
 63.  See generally Scott J. Nordstrand & Paul D. Seyferth, Private Rights Versus 
Public Power: The Role of State Action in Alaska Constitutional Jurisprudence, 7 ALASKA 
L. REV. 299 (1990). 
 64.  See generally Robert F. Williams, State Constitutional Religion Clauses: 
Lessons from the New Judicial Federalism, 7 U. ST. THOMAS J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 192 
(2013). 
 65.  See Steven Keith Green, Freedom of Religion in Alaska: Interpreting the Alaska 
Constitution, 5 ALASKA L. REV. 237, 239 (1988) (stating “the language of section 4 is 
taken almost verbatim from the religion clauses of the first amendment to the 
United States Constitution”). 
 66.  WILLIAMS, supra note 6, at 135–39. 
 67.  WILLIAMS, supra note 6, at 363. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Samuel 
Kercheval (July 12, 1816) in THOMAS JEFFERSON, WRITINGS 1395, 1402 (Library of 
America ed. 1984). For a complete analysis of Jefferson’s attitudes toward 
constitutional change, see JOHN R. VILE, THE CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDING PROCESS 
IN AMERICAN POLITICAL THOUGHT 59–78 (1992); see also Merrill D. Peterson, Mr. 
Jefferson’s “Sovereignty of the Living Generation”, 52 VA. Q. REV. 437, 437–44 (1976).  
 68.  WILLIAMS, supra note 6, at 363. 
 69.  Id. 
 70.  See Robert J. Martineau, The Mandatory Referendum on Calling a State 
Constitutional Convention: Enforcing the People’s Right to Reform Their Government, 
31 OHIO ST. U. L. REV. 421, 423–26 (1970) (explaining that the mandatory 
referendum regularly submits the question of calling a constitutional convention 
directly to the people of the state). See generally Gerald Benjamin, The Mandatory 
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Political scientists Gerald Benjamin and Thomas Gais have observed 
what they call “conventionphobia” in the United States.71 Even states with 
an automatic vote on whether to call a convention have not had recent 
success.72 The Alaska Constitutional Convention adopted the automatic 
referendum, requiring a decision every ten years on whether to call a 
constitutional convention.73  Such a referendum, however, has never been 
approved.74 
The public has continued to vote against conventions even as 
dissatisfaction with state governments has increased.75 The public seems 
to view a constitutional convention as political business as usual by the 
“government industry,”76 indicating a sentiment that a convention would 
not produce any beneficial changes. 
Constitutional conventions seem to have lost their legitimacy in 
the public mind. At the time many states’ original constitutions 
were drafted, the politicians and special interests were afraid of 
the people acting through constitutional conventions. Now, by 
contrast, the people are afraid of politicians and special interests 
acting through constitutional conventions.77 
These observations may be true in Alaska. 
The Alaska Constitution, unlike a number of other state 
constitutions, does not contain an explicit separation-of-powers clause.78 
Some state courts place special emphasis on the fact that their 
constitutions contain a textual mandate of separation of powers.79 Even 
without a textual mandate, the Alaska Supreme Court, of course, applies 
 
Constitutional Convention Question Referendum: The New York Experience in National 
Context, in STATE CONSTITUTIONS FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY: THE POLITICS OF 
STATE CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM 145 (G. Alan Tarr & Robert F. Williams eds., 2006) 
(detailing the role of the automatic referendum in New York). But see supra note 
28 and accompanying text. 
 71.  See generally Gerald Benjamin & Thomas Gais, Constitutional 
Conventionphobia, 1 HOFSTRA L. & POL’Y SYMP. 53 (1996).  
 72.  See id. at 69–70 (detailing recent failures of automatic referendums). 
 73.  MCBEATH, supra note 50, at 214–15. 
 74.  Id. at 215. 
 75.  See Benjamin & Gais, supra note 71 (noting “the pervasive public hostility 
to government institutions is automatically extended to conventions”). 
 76.  Benjamin & Gais, supra note 71, at 71; see also Thomas Gais & Gerald 
Benjamin, Public Discontent and the Decline of Deliberation: A Dilemma in State 
Constitutional Reform, 68 TEMPLE L. REV. 1291, 1304 (1995) (noting “public cynicism 
about permanent governmental institutions carries over into views regarding 
constitutional conventions”). 
 77.  WILLIAMS, supra note 6, at 388. 
 78.  MCBEATH, supra note 50, at 69. 
 79.  Id. at 237–38. See generally G. Alan Tarr, Interpreting the Separation of Powers 
in State Constitutions, 59 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 329 (2003). 
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a separation of powers doctrine.80 This is despite the fact that the federal 
constitutional doctrine does not apply to the states.81 
The Alaska Constitution is also unique in its approach to natural 
resources. As Gerald McBeath has asserted: “Alaska is the only state that 
has a clear and explicit article in its basic law on natural resources.”82 This 
article may be compared favorably with other later state constitutions’ 
environmental and natural resource provisions.83 
The Alaska Constitution specifically prohibits a limited state 
constitutional convention.84 This can further impede voter approval of a 
state constitutional convention.85 Perhaps the time will come when the 
Alaska Constitution should be evaluated to determine whether it is still, 
in Alan Tarr’s term, “coherent.” This can be a useful exercise. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
John Bebout, who consulted on the drafting of New Jersey’s “model” 
1947 Constitution, provided advice to Alaska’s constitution makers. In 
1991, Bebout said, “Alaska’s is, on the whole, the best written constitution 
in the country . . . .”86 Alaska’s drafters made practical use of the lessons 
developed over almost two centuries of state constitution making. They 
were keenly aware of Alaska’s potential place within a federal union and, 
at the same time, its unique challenges. This simultaneous awareness of 
state and federal contexts is the hallmark of American state 
constitutionalism. 
 
 80.  Tarr, supra note 79. 
 81.  WILLIAMS, supra note 6, at 240. 
 82.  MCBEATH, supra note 50, at 15. 
 83.  See generally Barton H. Thompson, Jr., Environmental Policy and State 
Constitutions: The Potential Role of Substantive Guidance, 27 RUTGERS L.J. 863 (1996). 
 84.  ALASKA CONST. art. XIII, § 4. 
 85.  MCBEATH, supra note 50, at 216; see also G. Alan Tarr & Robert F. Williams, 
Foreword, Getting from Here to There: Twenty-First Century Mechanisms and 
Opportunities in State Constitutional Reform, 36 RUTGERS L.J. 1075, 1085–92 (2005) 
(discussing the benefits and legality of limited state constitutional conventions). 
 86.  MCBEATH, supra note 50, at 20. 
